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On 23 March 2020, Bulgaria’s Parliament enacted a Law on the Measures and
Actions during the State of Emergency Announced by Parliament on 13 March
2020 (hereby referred to as Law on Emergency for brevity). This was the second
attempt to enact this piece of legislation after Bulgaria’s President vetoed some
of its provisions. This new Law entered into force retroactively on 13 March 2020
when Parliament declared a state of emergency (izvunredno polojenie) in light of
COVID-19. The peculiar situation that Parliament can declare a state of emergency,
define its scope and provide guidance on the measures which could be taken
later, and apply the law retroactively to justify measures and actions taken by the
executive in the period before defining these terms is troublesome from a rule of
law perspective. Moreover, some of the measures go beyond healthcare concerns
and create opportunities for arbitrariness and human rights violations. Besides,
the circumstances, which informed some of the provisions, seem to illustrate
longstanding problems of Bulgaria’s democracy.
Vague and Messy Legal Framework
Not only is Bulgaria’s legal framework pertaining to emergencies vague, but also
it seems to conflate notions, which opens the door to abuses. The Constitution
provides little guidance on what a state of emergency is and what its terms could be.
Article 84(12) of the Constitution stipulates that Parliament can declare martial law
or another type of state of emergency upon the proposal of the Council of Ministers
or the President. Pursuant its Article 57(3), a Law could be enacted to limit citizens’
rights in cases of war, martial law or another type of state of emergency, but it
cannot compromise the right to life, freedom from torture/degrading treatment, the
right to a fair trial, the right to private life, and the right to freedom of thought. The
Law on Defense and Armed Forces, which refers to both martial law and a state of
emergency, seems to define the state of emergency as a military question. Article
122 specifies that a ‘state of emergency’ could be declared by Parliament if there
is ‘a risk’ of involving the country ‘in a military-political crisis or in an armed conflict’.
Article 123 defines the powers of the army in such cases.
#he Law on Defense against Disasters has a broad definition of ‘disaster’ (Article
2), which can encompass the COVID-19 pandemic, and strict guidelines about
the measures institutions could take in case of bedstveno polojenie, which can
be translated as a ‘state of distress’ or ‘a state of emergency due to a disaster’.
Declaring such a state can be done on a municipal, regional or state level and does
not pass through Parliament. This is the traditional tool Bulgaria uses to handle
crises due to floods, draught, etc. However, very likely because of the restrictions
on the types of measures which can be imposed in cases of emergencies due to
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disasters in this Law, Bulgaria’s government chose the vague pathway of ‘state of
emergency’.
Finally, it should be noted that after the state of emergency was declared on 13
March 2020, the colleges of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) took their own
measures to adapt to the COVID-19 crisis. On 15 March 2020, the judicial college
took the decision to freeze most criminal, civil, commercial, and administrative
proceedings in courts, to interrupt the registration of claims, and to forbid physical
access to court by citizens (e-justice is not developed at all in Bulgaria). Luckily,
following public uproar, subsequent decisions by SJC’s judicial college, the latest
one of 31 March 2020, introduced exceptions allowing citizens to challenge diverse
actions and decisions by state institutions during the state of emergency. This
alleviated some of the concerns that citizens would not be able to contest arbitrary
actions by the executive during the state of emergency. For example, prior to the
latest decision by SJC’s judicial college, courts could not examine the legality of
administrative actions/omissions while this state of emergency lasted. Despite
progress made as a result of the latest decisions by SJC’s judicial college, diverse
concerns remain. For instance, hearings to determine pre-trial custody measures,
which the Prosecutor’s Office traditionally misemploys, have automatically become
closed pursuant to SJC’s judicial college’s decision of 15 March 2020, so civil society
cannot monitor them. Moreover, some members of the SJC have raised a voice
against a possible contradiction between the measures taken by SJC’s judicial
college and the Law on Emergency — they believe that because of the dubious
wording of the aforementioned Law, it is unclear if courts can examine the legality of
orders by the executive at all.
Unnecessary Crackdown on Human Rights
The Law on Emergency, in its current shape, has problematic provisions from the
perspective of the rule of law and human rights. Considering courts are not fully
functioning because of the measures taken by SJC’s judicial college in light of
COVID-19  and having in mind that Bulgaria’s Minister of Justice made a vague,
albeit alarming statement, that Bulgaria would ask for a derogation pursuant to
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the door to finding relief
might be about to close.
For example, Article 10(5) of the new Law authorizes the army to use physical force
against civilians if it is ‘absolutely necessary’, but how this threshold will be observed
and enforced in these evolving circumstances is difficult to say. Article 2 allows the
Minister of Healthcare to impose any measures beyond the Law on Healthcare he
deems necessary during the state of emergency, without Parliament approval, which
is extremely vague. The scope of these measures is not specified (we only see
they should comply with existing laws), so it seems he is now entitled to implement
measures in all areas of law based on his whims (criminal law, commercial law, etc.
included).
A seemingly minor, but not at all benign amendment to the Law on Electronic
Communication, implemented through the Law on Emergency, allows the police
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to ask Telecommunication companies for an ‘immediate access’ to traffic data of
users, without judicial oversight. This is not just a violation of the right to private
life. Considering the rampant corruption and the rule of law decline in Bulgaria,
there are obvious concerns this provision will not just be used to track if people
under quarantine observe it, as it is ‘intended’. Instead, it may be used to gather
information about government critics — the police does not need to present any
proof to these providers that the person is under quarantine, etc. (even if they had
do, this can easily be falsified).
As mentioned above, the President vetoed some of the provisions of the Law
on Emergency. These provisions were included because of the impulses of the
Prosecutor’s Office. In prior work, I have showcased how Bulgaria’s Prosecutor’s
Office is considered a threat to the rule of law because of its excessive powers
mimicking the Soviet prosecution model and the lack of checks and balances,
which permit the misuse of this institution for political aims. This can be seen in the
COVID-19 crisis, too. For example, the Prosecutor’s Office opened investigations
against doctors in a state hospital designated to treat COVID-19 because they
publicly complained from lack of equipment. It is in this context that the Prosecutor’s
Office asked for the criminalization of spreading false information regarding
COVID-19 and severe sanctions (prison sentences) which Parliament included in the
draft of the Law on Emergency. Beyond the key issue of freedom of speech, how the
Prosecutor’s Office can judge if information about a specific and evolving medical
issue is true, when it is clear they have no expertise in epidemiology or medicine at
large, is a mystery which also opens the door for abuses against critics. While the
President managed to veto this provision, Bulgaria’s ruling party said it would work
on this provision further and enact it at a later stage.
Solidifying Autocracy
Bulgaria’s government, which has been following the autocratic playbook for a
long while, seems to be creating loopholes to exploit the COVID-19 crisis. In the
Bulgarian context, ‘mistakes’ are rarely accidental. Prime Minister Boyko Borissov
enjoys full comfort in Parliament. The only institution that can engage in corrective
behavior is the Presidency which has very limited powers (the current President
Rumen Radev is from the opposition). Parliament is not bound by a presidential
veto. It seems that it complied with the veto this time because the President only
targeted two provisions and Parliament was in a rush to define the terms of the
state of emergency. Yet, what about the next time? Parliament traditionally ignores
presidential vetoes on Bills concerning human rights — one of the most flagrant
examples was the Bill on secret arrests which was enacted at the end. There are
plenty of draft laws aiming to enforce Borissov’s police state which may be revamped
as ‘state of emergency’ Bills. In fact, on 26 March 2020, Parliament took the decision
to sit to consider ‘only Bills pertaining to the state of emergency’ during the state of
emergency, which closed the door to effective parliamentary control of administrative
rulemaking — a sure sign that Bulgaria’s democracy is further endangered.
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The article is current as of the latest publicly available information by state
institutions on 3 April 2020.
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